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DISCRIMINATION V. RETALIATION: WHAT LEVEL OF HARM IS 
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE VII? 
 
Brendan Hanner White 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employers from discriminating against 
employees who are members of a protected class.
1
 Two provisions of Title VII advance this goal. 
Section 703
2
 sets forth the basic prohibition, stating that an employer cannot “discriminate 
against” an employee based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” with regard to an 
employee‟s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”3 Section 704,4 Title 
VII‟s anti-retaliation provision, supplements this ban by making it “an unlawful employment 
practice” for an employer to “discriminate against any of his employees…because he has 
opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”5 Also under section 704, an employer 
cannot discriminate against an employee because that employee has “made a charge, testified, 
                                                          
1
 See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or, 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”).  
3
 Id. 
4
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees or applicants for employment…because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”). 
5
 Id. 
2 
 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under section 
703. 
6
   
In analyzing these two sections, courts have struggled to determine whether some 
minimum level of harm must be shown to trigger the protections of these prohibitions, and, if so, 
what that level of harm should be. Neither statute specifies a “baseline” level of harm as an 
element of the cause of action. 
7
  
Nonetheless, prior to the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White,
8
 almost every Circuit recognized a minimum “adverse employment 
action” requirement in order to bring either a section 703 or section 704 claim.9 The effect of 
recognizing an “adverse employment action” element was to require an employee show more 
than the employer‟s action was motivated by discrimination. In addition, the employee had to 
show the employer‟s action caused him a minimum level of harm that is “serious,”10 
“significant,”11 or “material.”12    
                                                          
6 Id. 
7
 See Leading Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 320 (2006). 
8
 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
9
 See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 320. See also Autumn George, Student Author, “Adverse Employment Action”-
How Much Harm Must be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1075, 1082 
(2009); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 Emory L.J. 1121, 1131 (1998); Lisa Taylor, Adding 
Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard Fire: A Proposal for Congressional Intervention After Burlington Northern v. 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 533, 536-7 (2007). 
10
 Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation, 536 F. 3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that an African 
American plaintiff’s claim that she was disciplined more harshly that her white colleague was not a serious enough 
employment action to assert a cognizable claim under section 703).    
11
 Vann v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 179 Fed. Appx. 491, 498 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding a transfer that did 
not require plaintiff to buy or sell a house was not a change in employment significant enough to assert a 
cognizable claim under section 703).  
12
 Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F. 3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding the plaintiff’s reassignment to sell 
homes in another neighborhood was not a material harm under section 703 because the reassignment would not 
affect the plaintiff’s compensation).  
3 
 
 In Burlington Northern, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether an “adverse 
action” was necessary to establish a claim under section 704.13 The Supreme Court stated the 
legal questions presented in Burlington Northern as follows: “Does [section 704] confine 
actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how 
harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?”14 
 The Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, reasoning that the 
coverage of section 704 “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory 
acts and harm.”15 As to the second question, the Supreme Court held an adverse action must be 
“material,” which the Supreme Court defined as conduct harmful enough that it would have 
“dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”16 
In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court compared the reach of section 703 and 
section 704. It did so in part because the defendant and the Solicitor General argued that liability 
under both section 703 and section 704 was triggered only by a material change in the “terms or 
conditions of employment.”17 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that Title 
VII provided broader protection for victims of retaliation than for victims of race-based, religion-
based, ethnicity-based, or gender-based discrimination.
18
 The Supreme Court explained this 
difference resulted from Congress‟s inclusion of the “terms and conditions” language in section 
703 but not in section 704.  
                                                          
13
 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
14
 Id.  
15
 Id. at 67. 
16
 Id. at 68 (citing Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F. 3d. 1211, 1219 (C.A.D.C. 2006)).  
17
 While the Solicitor General agreed with the defendant regarding the materiality standard in the Sixth Circuit, the 
Solicitor General was not arguing that the actions by the defendant were insufficient to bring a claim under that 
test. 
18
 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 66. 
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 In establishing that section 703 and section 704 operate in different ways, the Supreme 
Court created uncertainty regarding the issue of whether a materiality standard exists for section 
703 claims, and, if so, what that standard would be.
19
 In particular, there is uncertainty as to 
whether any materiality standard for section 703 claims should be more burdensome on plaintiffs 
than the materiality standard the Supreme Court established for claims under section 704.   
In the wake of the Burlington Northern decision, all Circuit Courts presented with the 
issue have determined that a materiality standard exists for section 703 claims, finding the 
employer‟s action must cause direct or indirect economic harm to the employee.20 Some lower 
courts have gone further and determined that direct or indirect economic harm alone is not 
enough to establish a claim under section 703.
21
 These courts have found in Burlington Northern 
support for the view that the section 703 materiality standard requires an employee establish not 
only direct or indirect economic harm, but direct or indirect economic harm that is greater than 
the level of harm required to bring an action under section 704.
22
  
This reading of Burlington Northern is wrong. The Supreme Court did not hold or 
suggest that, if a materiality standard does exist for section 703 claims, it should be more onerous 
for plaintiffs, and more protective of employers, than the materiality standard imposed by section 
704.  
On close inspection, Burlington Northern leaves open three important questions 
regarding section 703 claims: First, does a materiality standard exist for such claims? Second, if 
a materiality standard does exist, what level of harm must be shown in order to bring such a 
                                                          
19
 Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 313. 
20
 See George, supra note 9, at 1087 (2009). 
21
 See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text. 
22
 This error is not limited to the courts. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 321-2. 
5 
 
claim? Third, if there is a materiality standard for section 703 claims, what is that standard‟s 
relationship to the materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern 
for section 704 claims? Each of these questions is sufficiently complex to warrant its own 
lengthy discussion. As a result, in this paper, I will put the first two questions to one side and 
address only the third question. 
 In particular, I ask whether the Title VII plaintiff must prove a greater material injury to 
establish a section 703 claim than a section 704 claim. I conclude the answer to this question is 
clearly “no” and that lower courts have misread Burlington Northern in reaching a contrary 
result.  
II. THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN OPINION 
In Burlington Northern, the plaintiff Sheila White worked for defendant Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company (hereafter “defendant”) as a “track laborer” with her 
primary responsibility being operation of the forklift.
23
 After complaining that her immediate 
supervisor made inappropriate remarks to her, White was moved to more standard track laborer 
tasks. Some of the standard track labor tasks performed by White after this move were removing 
and replacing track components, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spillage. These tasks 
involved dirty, heavy manual labor, unlike her forklift duties.
24
 Faced with this change in job 
responsibility, White filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(hereafter “EEOC”), claiming that this reassignment was the result of retaliation for her earlier 
complaints.
25
 Shortly thereafter, White was suspended without pay on the basis that her 
                                                          
23
 548 U.S. at 57. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 58. 
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supervisor claimed she was insubordinate, although the suspension was later overturned and 
White received backpay.
26
 Both the reassignment and the suspension formed the basis of the 
retaliation claim White brought against the defendant.  
 In defense of the section 704 claim brought by White, the defendant did not argue that the 
motivation for its actions was not retaliatory.
27
 Rather, the defendant contended that its alleged 
actions were not harmful enough to support a claim under section 704. More specifically, the 
defendant stated that the reassignment of duties did not constitute impermissible retaliation 
because moving White to more standard track laborer tasks fell within the same job 
description.
28
 With regard to the suspension, the defendant alleged that no adverse action had 
taken place because White was eventually reinstated with backpay.
29
  
A jury found in favor of White and awarded her $43,500 in compensatory damages, 
including $3,250 in medical expenses. The District Court denied the defendant‟s post-trial 
motion for judgment based on the defenses mentioned above as a matter of law. A panel of the 
Sixth Circuit reversed, but the full Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, voted to uphold the District 
Court‟s judgment.30 The judges differed, however, on what level of harm an employer‟s action 
must reach in order to support a section 704 claim.
31
 A majority of the Circuit Court used the 
case as an opportunity to confirm the Sixth Circuit‟s previously established materiality standard 
for section 703 discrimination claims set forth in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management.
32
 
Specifically, the Circuit Court held that the employer‟s action must involve a materially adverse 
                                                          
26
 Id. at 58-9. 
27
 Id. at 70. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. at 72. 
30
 Id. at 59. 
31
 Id. 
32
 97 F. 3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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change in the terms of the worker‟s employment. 33 The Sixth Circuit majority in Burlington 
Northern concluded that this standard should also apply to retaliation claims.
34
 Under this 
interpretation, a claim could only be brought under section 704 if the harm imposed on the 
employer was actionable under section 703, and vice versa. In a concurring opinion, five judges 
of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with this standard, suggesting that no materiality standard should 
operate for section 704 claims because no words within section 704 comparable to the “terms 
and conditions” language of section 703 expressed any limitation on the anti-retaliation 
provision‟s application.35 The decision of the Sixth Circuit conflicted with decisions of other 
circuits regarding the materiality standard for section 704, and the Supreme Court took the case 
for that reason.
 36
 
 In its opinion, the Supreme Court outlined the several definitions of “adverse 
employment action” used by lower courts in applying section 704. In addition to the Sixth 
Circuit‟s holding that section 703 and section 704 have an identical materiality standard, the 
Supreme Court noted the Fifth and Eighth Circuits had adopted a more defendant-favorable 
approach to evaluating section 704 claims.
37
 Specifically, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied 
an “ultimate employment decision” standard, which limited actionable retaliatory conduct to acts 
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.”38 The Supreme 
Court noted that other Circuit Courts allowed application of section 704 even when the alleged 
harm does not concern hiring, firing or compensation decisions. In particular, the Seventh Circuit 
and District of Columbia Circuit had required only that the alleged conduct “would likely have 
                                                          
33
 White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
34
 Id.  
35
 See id. at 816-7 (Clay, concurring). 
36
 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 60. 
37
Id.  
38
 Id. (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodax Co., 104 F. 3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
8 
 
„dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,‟ ”39 while 
the Ninth Circuit mandated that the plaintiff establish that the alleged retaliatory treatment must 
be “reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.”40  
 After outlining these different approaches, the Supreme Court addressed the argument of 
the defendant and the Solicitor General that the anti-retaliation provision should be read “in pari 
materia” with the antidiscrimination provision.41 Specifically, the defendant and the Solicitor 
General argued that application of section 704 should be limited to conduct that “affects the 
employee‟s „compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.‟ ”42 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, stating that section 703 differs from section 704 “in important 
ways.”43  
In drawing a distinction between the two sections, the Supreme Court stated that the 
words “hire,” “discharge,” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 
“employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” present in the language of section 703 
explicitly limit the application of that section to “actions that affect employment or alter the 
conditions of the workplace.”44 In comparison, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that “[n]o 
such limiting words appear in the antiretaliation provision.”45 The Supreme Court determined 
                                                          
39
 Id. (citing Washington v. Illinois Dept of Revenue, 420 F. 3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
40
 Id. at 61 (citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F. 3d 1234, 1242-1243 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. at 62. 
45
 Id. 
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Congress must have intended this difference in language to signal that these two sections have a 
different scope. 
46
  
The Supreme Court relied on statutory purpose, as well as statutory text, in making this 
determination. According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of section 703 is to provide 
“equality of employment opportunities” and to avoid the creation of “stratified job 
environments.” 47 To achieve these objectives, Congress did not need to prohibit employer 
conduct “other than employment-related discrimination.”48 The objective of section 704, in 
contrast, is “preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee‟s 
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act‟s basic guarantees.” 49 To properly achieve 
this end, Congress needed to include employer actions that occur beyond the workplace because 
“[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly 
related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”50 Based on these 
differences in purpose and language, the Supreme Court found that section 704, unlike section 
703, “is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of 
employment.”51 In making this determination, the Supreme Court also noted “Congress has 
provided similar kinds of protection from retaliation in comparable statutes without any judicial 
suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the primary substantive 
provisions.”52 On this basis, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the defendant and the 
                                                          
46
 Id. at 63. 
47
 Id. (emphasis added). 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 64. 
52
 Id. at 66. The Supreme Court relied specifically on the National Labor Relations Act and its anti-retaliation 
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), and decisions cited under that statute. See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 
461 U.S. 731 (1983); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
10 
 
Solicitor General, holding instead that section 704 is not limited to discrimination with respect to 
employment-related activity.
53
 Therefore, certain employer actions can establish a claim under 
section 704 if motivated by retaliation that would not establish a claim under section 703 if 
motivated by discrimination.  
 After determining that section 704 reached adverse action outside the workplace, the 
Supreme Court turned to the level of harm an employee needs to show in order to bring a claim 
under this section. Ultimately, the Supreme Court adopted the approach previously endorsed by 
the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits, namely that an employee must show the 
retaliatory conduct would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”54 In holding that a claim under section 704 required a level of harm 
that should be viewed under an objective standard, the Supreme Court stated it was trying to 
“separate significant from trivial harms.”55 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that “petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” will not dissuade a reasonable 
worker from complaining of discriminatory conduct.
56
 Through this holding, the Supreme Court, 
for the first time,
57
 established a materiality standard under Title VII. 
 Based on this materiality standard, the Supreme Court found there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury‟s verdict on White‟s retaliation claim.58 First, the Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant‟s argument that sufficient retaliatory conduct did not occur because 
White‟s reassigned duties still fell within her job description. The Supreme Court noted that 
                                                          
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 68 (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (C.A.D.C. 2006)). 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
  Cf. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Ellerth did not address the question of materiality; 
rather, it addressed the question of vicarious liability under Title VII’s section 703. 
58
  Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 70. 
11 
 
almost every job category involves responsibilities and duties that are less desirable than others 
and that an effective way to discourage an employee from complaining of discrimination would 
be to assign her more arduous tasks.
59
 The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that 
White‟s reinstatement with backpay made her suspension statutorily insignificant. The Supreme 
Court noted that while White did receive backpay, she was still without a paycheck for a 
month.
60
 White‟s emotional distress during the period in which she had no income supported the 
conclusion that “[a] reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining her job (and 
paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint might well choose the former.”61 Therefore, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.  
III. THE LOWER COURTS‟ INTERPRETATION OF THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN 
OPINION 
Burlington Northern did not establish the scope of a materiality standard regarding 
section 703 claims, nor did it explore the relationship between the section 704 materiality 
standard and any potential materiality standard for section 703 claims. Nevertheless, several 
lower courts have read Burlington Northern as confirming the need for plaintiffs to prove a more 
material injury to establish a section 703 claim than a section 704 claim.
62
 The following 
decisions from the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit illustrate the point.  
 
 
                                                          
59
 Id. at 70-1. 
60
 Id. at 72. 
61
 Id. at 73. 
62
 See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text. See also George, supra note 9, at 1085 (recognizing the Eleventh 
Circuit’s test was unchanged by Burlington Northern). 
12 
 
 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
 In Grimsley v. Marshall,
63
 the Eleventh Circuit held that it would continue to apply the 
materiality standard for discrimination claims under section 703 that it had established prior to 
the Burlington Northern decision. In Grimsley, the plaintiff, a white warehouse supervisor for the 
defendant Marshalls of Ma, Inc., alleged he was treated differently from African American 
warehouse supervisors. Specifically, he alleged that, unlike African American supervisors, he 
was asked to work late and on weekends, was given more work than African American 
supervisors, and was required to perform manual labor tasks usually reserved for hourly 
employees, such as sweeping or re-taping lines on the floor in areas assigned to African 
American supervisors.
64
 When the plaintiff asked why he was assigned specialized work in the 
African American supervisors‟ areas and was generally assigned more work, his supervisor 
responded that the African American supervisors were “too lazy” and “too stupid” to perform 
jobs adequately.
65
 The district court held that the plaintiff had in fact presented direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent but granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that the harm 
alleged was not sufficient to establish an adverse employment action.
66
  
 On appeal, the plaintiff argued he was not required to show an “adverse employment 
action” because it was undisputed that the acts in question were motivated by race.67 In support 
of this argument, the plaintiff cited Burlington Northern as confirmation of a broad application 
                                                          
63
 284 F. App’x. 604 (11th Cir. 2008).  
64
 Id. at 606. 
65
 Id.  
66
 See id. at 607. 
67
 Id. at 609. 
13 
 
of Title VII‟s anti-discrimination provision. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, 
reasoning the “materially adverse” standard of Burlington Northern was limited to anti-
retaliation claims and, that “the Supreme Court was careful to note that a different standard 
applied to substantive claims of discrimination.”68 The Eleventh Circuit went on to emphasize its 
view of the distinction made in Burlington Northern by stating that the case had held that “the 
anti-retaliation provision forbids conduct not prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision.”69 
Based on this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit stated the Burlington Northern decision confirmed 
the application of its materiality standard for Title VII anti-discrimination claims previously 
established in Davis v. Town of Lake Park, namely, that “to prove adverse employment action in 
a case under Title VII‟s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show a serious and 
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 70 Based on the “serious 
and material change” standard established in Davis, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.71  
B. The Fifth Circuit 
 The Fifth Circuit has also interpreted Burlington Northern as confirming that its 
demanding materiality standard of “ultimate employment decisions” remains controlling for 
section 703 discrimination claims even though the Supreme Court rejected this standard for 
purposes of section 704.
72
 In Mitchell v. Snow,
73
 the plaintiff Mitchell received a score of 4.2 out 
                                                          
68
 Id. at 608. 
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at 608 (citing Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)).  
71
 Id. at 611. 
72
 Mitchell v. Snow, 326 F. App’x. 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2009). See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“We therefore 
reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the antiretaliation provision as forbidding 
the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to so-
called ‘ultimate employment decisions’”). 
14 
 
of 5 in her early job performance review for the fiscal year ending in May 2003. Mitchell argued 
that this review reflected unlawful discrimination based on her race and sex.
74
 The district court 
employed the “ultimate employment decision” test established in the Fifth Circuit, holding that 
section 703 supports discrimination claims only for decisions such as “hiring, granting leave, 
discharging, promoting or compensating.”75 Finding no evidence that connected Mitchell‟s 
performance review to her compensation, the district court granted a motion for summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.
76
 In other words, even if the performance review was 
impermissibly motivated, it was not actionable without a showing of economic loss. 
 On appeal, Mitchell argued the Burlington Northern decision suggested that a claim 
under section 703 only requires the employer action in question be motivated by discrimination 
so long as the act occurs within the workplace.
77
 Therefore, because the poor job performance 
review was motivated by discrimination and directly concerned her work, Mitchell argued she 
had a valid cause of action under section 703. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, finding 
instead that Burlington Northern established that “title VII‟s anti-retaliation provision is broader 
than the range covered by its anti-discrimination provisions.”78 Based on this analysis of 
Burlington Northern, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that its highly exacting “adverse employment 
action” standard was “therefore accurate.”79 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court‟s grant of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
73
  326 F. App’x. 852 (5th Cir. 2009). 
74
 Id. at 854-5. 
75
 Id. at 854 (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007)). The McCoy decision was 
decided after Burlington Northern. However, in that decision the Fifth Circuit directly addressed whether 
Burlington Northern affected its materiality standard regarding section 703 claims. The court specifically stated 
that even after Burlington Northern the previously established materiality standard regarding section 703 claims 
(referenced above) remains controlling.  
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at 854-5. 
78
 Id. at 855.  
79
 Id. 
15 
 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the poor job performance review did not 
constitute an ultimate employment decision.  
C. The Sixth Circuit 
 Although the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern directly stated that the Sixth 
Circuit‟s interpretation of the materiality standard regarding section 704 was incorrect,80 the 
Sixth Circuit has read that decision as confirming the appropriateness of retaining that very 
standard for section 703 claims.  In discussing the merits of the plaintiff‟s discrimination claim in 
Tepper v. Potter,
81
 in which the plaintiff alleged the termination of his religious accommodation 
was impermissible faith-based discrimination, the Sixth Circuit spelled out its interpretation of 
section 703‟s “adverse employment action” standard in the wake of the Burlington Northern 
decision. Emphasizing that Burlington Northern distinguished the anti-retaliation and the anti-
discrimination provisions in Title VII, the Circuit Court ruled that Burlington Northern, “did not 
expand or alter this Court‟s formulation of an adverse employment action for purposes of the 
discrimination claim before us.”82 Therefore, the court found the plaintiff did not meet the 
materiality standard established in the Sixth Circuit, which requires a material change in 
employment status such as “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in 
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished 
material responsibilities, or other indices.” 83 
                                                          
80
 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“We therefore reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that 
have treated the antiretaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination 
provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to so-called ‘ultimate employment decisions’”). 
81
 505 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2007). 
82
 Id. at 515. 
83
  Id. (citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)).  
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IV. CRITIQUING LOWER COURTS‟ APPLICATION OF BURLINGTON NORTHERN TO 
SECTION 703 CLAIMS. 
 As the previous discussion shows, Circuit Courts are holding that any materiality 
standard for a discrimination claim brought under section 703 is more demanding of plaintiffs 
than the materiality standard established for section 704 claims. A proper understanding of the 
language used by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern to distinguish the two sections, as 
well as the intended purpose behind each section, shows this materiality distinction made by the 
lower courts is incorrect.   
A. Improper understanding of the reasoning of Burlington Northern to distinguish section 703 
and section 704. 
Courts have read Burlington Northern as setting a heightened materiality standard under 
section 703, based on the belief that the case held the materiality standard established for section 
704 is more protective of plaintiffs than any materiality standard for section 703.
84
 This 
confusion is understandable. However, it reflects a misreading of Burlington Northern. 
 The fundamental misunderstanding of the lower courts in interpreting Burlington 
Northern stems from a failure to appreciate the particular context in which the Supreme Court 
broadened the reach of section 704 in relation to section 703. In differentiating the two sections, 
the Supreme Court was highlighting that section 704 is broader than section 703 in regard to 
section 704‟s coverage, not its materiality standard. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that section 703 outlaws discrimination only as to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or 
                                                          
84
 See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.  
17 
 
privileges of employment.”85 The Supreme Court stated, however, that “[n]o such limiting words 
appear in the antiretaliation provision” of section 704.86 This textual distinction allowed the 
Supreme Court to reason that “Congress intended the differences” in coverage between the two 
sections and that those differences mattered.
87
 The Supreme Court added that this different 
coverage makes sense because “the two provisions differ not only in language but in purpose as 
well.”88 Therefore, the Court determined the anti-retaliation provision is “not coterminous” with 
the anti-discrimination provision because it “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-
related retaliatory acts and harm.”89 
 The only distinction between the two sections articulated by the Supreme Court is that 
section 704 has a broader coverage than section 703 in that section 704 can apply to actions that 
fall completely outside of the work environment, while the coverage of section 703 is limited to 
discrimination that takes place within the office or directly relates to the employee/employer 
relationship.
90
 This distinction makes sense because an employer can retaliate against an 
employee in a way that is completely separate from the work environment, and conduct that has 
an impermissibly retaliatory effect can involve action wholly independent from the 
employee/employer relationship. Simply put, the Supreme Court recognized that retaliatory acts 
having no relation to terms, condition or privileges of employment can still deter an employee 
from complaining about discrimination. Therefore, in order to give full meaning to the language 
and purpose of section 704, actions outside the workplace could fall within the statute‟s 
coverage.  
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For example, if a supervisor is the coach of the little league team on which the 
employee‟s son is a player, and the supervisor cuts the employee‟s son from the team in 
retaliation for the employee‟s filing of a discrimination charge, that would be retaliatory conduct 
actionable under section 704 because this conduct would chill a reasonable employee from filing 
or moving forward with a discrimination claim.
91
 However, such an act would not be actionable 
under section 703 even if cutting the employee‟s son from the team was motivated by the 
employee‟s race, national origin, religion or sex. While such an action motivated by 
discrimination would unquestionably be morally reprehensible, it has no connection to the work 
environment or the employee/employer relationship.
92
 As a result, the employee would have no 
right to file a discrimination charge against the employer for this act under section 703 of Title 
VII.
93
 
 In this sense, but only in this sense, it is accurate to say the reach of section 704 is 
broader than the reach of section 703. Section 704 reaches non-work-related acts, while section 
703 does not. Nothing in Burlington Northern, however, narrows the application of section 703 
for acts that do occur within the workplace.   
 Rulings of the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits illustrate how the lower courts have 
misinterpreted Burlington Northern as drawing a distinction between the two sections on the 
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basis of materiality.
94
 The basic problem is that these lower courts have indicated that even 
adverse actions that occur entirely within the workplace can be harmful enough to be actionable 
under section 704 but not harmful enough to be actionable under section 703.
95
 Nothing in 
Burlington Northern, however, supports this conclusion. 
This misinterpretation appears to stem from language the Supreme Court used in 
Burlington Northern that the lower courts have taken out of context. For example, the Supreme 
Court stated in Burlington Northern that, “we do not accept…that it is „anomalous‟ to read the 
statute to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for those whom Title VII 
primarily seeks to protect, namely, victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-based, or 
gender-based discrimination.”96 The Supreme Court went on to observe that it rejected the 
standards established in the Courts of Appeals “that have treated the antiretaliation provision as 
forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination provision.”97 Standing alone, 
this language might be used, and indeed has been used, to argue that section 703 requires a 
greater level of harm for an employee to bring a valid cause of action than the level of harm 
required for a section 704 claim. The problem with such an argument, however, is that the 
quoted language applies only to the coverage of the two provisions, and in particular the text-
based limitation that section 703 applies only to discrimination with regard to “terms and 
conditions of employment.” The quoted language does not in any way suggest that, when 
discrimination within the workplace occurs, a greater showing of materiality of harm is required 
for section 703 claims than for section 704 claims.  
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In short, to read Burlington Northern as confirming that any materiality standard for 
section 703 claims is more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy than the section 704 materiality 
standard established in that case is an incorrect interpretation of the Supreme Court‟s opinion.98 
B. Why Courts should reject a heightened materiality standard for section 703 claims.  
Properly understood, any employer action within the workplace reached by section 704 is 
an act that should support a section 703 discrimination claim. This is the case for at least three 
separate reasons. First, while the purpose of section 704 logically requires that an employer‟s 
discriminatory act create a reaction from an employee, the purpose of section 703 does not 
require that an employer‟s discriminatory act create any reaction at all. Second, the practicalities 
of human interactions support the need for a materiality standard regarding retaliation claims that 
is not present for claims of discrimination. Third, it would be illogical for the core provision of 
Title VII to give less protection to employees than the subsidiary provision that implements the 
basic ban on discrimination.  
1. The different purposes behind section 703 and section 704 dictate that the materiality 
standard for section 703 should not be more exacting than the materiality standard for section 
704.  
 
 Section 703 and section 704 have different purposes. The purpose of section 703 is to 
remove discrimination based on race, sex, religion and national origin from the workplace.
99
 The 
purpose of section 704, in contrast, is to ensure an employee will not be deterred by his employer 
from filing, or assisting with, a section 703 discrimination complaint in order to ensure that the 
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statutory mandate of section 703 is fulfilled.
100
 Based on this purpose, the materiality standard 
established for section 704 claims in Burlington Northern is understandable. An employer‟s 
action can only give rise to effective retaliation when that action is so significant that it would 
have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”101 
Therefore, if the employer‟s action is not sufficiently harmful to the employee, the employer has 
not violated the purpose of section 704 even if his act was motivated by a desire to retaliate. 
 In striking contrast, there is no cause and effect relationship between an employer‟s 
discriminatory action and the employee‟s response that has anything to do with the purpose of 
section 703.The purpose behind section 703 is to ensure employees are not treated differently in 
the work place based on their race, sex, religion or national origin. Achieving this goal has no 
connection with how an employee will or will not react to the employer‟s discriminatory 
conduct. Therefore, discrimination, as defined by the purpose of section 703, does not logically 
focus at all on the reaction of the employee to the employer‟s conduct.  For example, an 
employer who refuses to sit with an employee because of his religious beliefs has violated the 
purpose of section 703 by creating a workplace where an employee is treated differently because 
of his religion. Whether or not that specific employee feels uncomfortable as a result of this 
action is irrelevant to the purpose behind the statute. It is possible that this identical conduct, 
motivated by the employer‟s desire to retaliate, would not be harmful enough to support a claim 
under section 704. If this conduct would not chill an employee from filing or assisting in a 
charge of discrimination, the purpose behind section 704 would not be fulfilled by prohibiting 
such an action. However, the same is not true in respect to the purpose behind section 703. The 
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act itself, regardless of the employee‟s reaction, creates a work environment where employees 
are treated adversely based on discrimination.    
Put another way, prohibiting discrimination in accordance with the purpose of section 
703 would seem to only require analysis of the employer‟s intent for the act in question, not the 
employee‟s reaction to that act. In contrast, to find retaliation as defined by the purpose of 
section 704 requires an analysis of the employer‟s intent for the act in question as well as the 
employee‟s reaction to that act. Perhaps, the different purposes of section 703 and section 704 
offer support for the view that no showing of materiality should be necessary to establish a claim 
under section 703. At the least, however, these differing purposes leave no doubt that any 
materiality standard imposed by the courts for section 703 claims should not be more demanding 
for plaintiffs than the materiality standard established by section 704.   
 2. While section 704 logically requires a materiality standard to protect understandable 
employer actions, no analogous justification for a materiality standard exists for section 703.  
 
 In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court explained that a materiality standard makes 
practical sense in the particular context of retaliation claims. As the Supreme Court emphasized, 
an employee filing a discrimination complaint “cannot immunize that employee from those petty 
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.”102 
In establishing that section 704 claims cannot be brought on the basis of “snubbing” or other 
somewhat trivial acts, the Supreme Court meant to protect the employer from being held liable 
for committing acts that are an understandable, perhaps inevitable, reaction to an employee‟s 
accusation of discrimination. It is a normal human reaction to become uncomfortable with or 
apprehensive around an individual who has accused one of discrimination. It is likely, and 
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certainly understandable, that a supervisor would change his interactions with an employee in the 
workplace after that employee has accused him of committing an unlawful act. It is also possible 
that resulting slights by the employer could make an employee feel uncomfortable. However, the 
level of discomfort caused by petty slights would not be significant enough to cause a reasonable 
employee to stop pursuing a claim of discrimination.
103
  
By requiring a minimum level of severity of the actions that would give rise to a valid 
section 704 claim, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that an employee should 
anticipate his interactions with his employer will change on some level after he has accused that 
employer of discrimination. By requiring retaliatory conduct reach a meaningful level of harm, 
the Supreme Court in effect protected employers to the extent their conduct is understandable. 
Only when the employer‟s conduct goes beyond a normal response to an employee‟s accusation 
of discrimination does a section 704 claim exist.  
 This understandable-reaction justification for imposing a materiality standard in section 
704 cases, however, has no application to employer actions that fall under section 703. The logic 
of this justification for claims under section 704 is that an employer acting differently toward an 
employee is a rational consequence of an employee accusing the employer of unlawful conduct. 
In contrast, an employer treating an employee differently because of his race, religion, sex or 
national origin is not a rational consequence of the employee‟s presence in the workplace. This 
difference between the two sections may well suggest that courts could rightly impose no 
materiality standard at all for claims under section 703. However, at a minimum, this difference 
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negates any claim that courts should apply a stricter materiality standard for section 703 than the 
one established under section 704.  
 3. It is anomalous to read Title VII as giving less protection to employees bringing a 
claim under its core provision than under its secondary provision.   
 
Even if one finds a materiality standard exists for section 703, imposing a more 
demanding materiality standard for section 703 claims than for section 704 claims would be an 
anomalous reading of Title VII.  Finding a more demanding materiality standard for section 703 
would indicate that it is proper to provide less protection in the workplace for those who are in 
fact discriminated against on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin or religion, the very 
victims which Title VII attempts to protect,
104
 than for those who merely complain about 
discrimination, even when such complaints are unfounded. That cannot be what Congress 
intended.  
For example, if an employee were moved from a larger, more desirable office to a 
smaller office that was less prestigious and less conducive to the work involved based on a 
retaliatory motive by the employer, the employee would potentially have an actionable claim 
under the objective materiality test established by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern for 
section 704. However, the exact same action motivated by a discriminatory intent would not be 
an actionable claim under section 703 based on the interpretation of the Burlington Northern 
case by several Circuit Courts because such an act does not “directly relate to the employee‟s 
compensation,” reflect an “ultimate employment action” or involve a “serious” harm.105 This 
example illustrates the flaw in reading section 704 to reach impermissibly motivated conduct in 
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the workplace that would not be actionable under section 703. Could the Supreme Court really 
have read Title VII to protect those who believe they have been discriminated against by their 
employers on the job, even if no discrimination occurred, while declining protection to those 
who have actually suffered workplace discrimination based on race, religion, national origin or 
sex? The answer is no. 
Several Circuit Courts have held that section 703 contains a materiality standard based on 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language within the statute.106 It is true that 
the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern highlighted that this language is present in section 
703 but is not present in section 704. However, this distinction was only used by the Supreme 
Court to show that section 703 was limited in its application to employer acts that occurred 
within the workplace. In no way was that language used by the Supreme Court as a basis for 
establishing that section 703 imposes its own materiality standard or that any materiality 
standard for section 703 must be stricter on plaintiffs than the section 704 materiality standard. 
The fact that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language is not present in 
section 704 should not be relied upon as a basis for holding section 703 has a materiality 
standard that is harsher on plaintiffs. Such an interpretation would undermine the purposes 
behind Title VII. Section 703 is centrally concerned with limiting an employer‟s ability to treat 
an employee differently based on his race, sex, religion or national origin. It would be an 
illogical reading of Title VII to hold an employer act that is harmful enough to deter an employee 
from pursuing a claim of discrimination is not harmful enough to hold an employee is being 
treated differently in the workplace.    
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Consider again the Grimsley case, in which the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiff did not 
suffer an “adverse employment action” for a section 703 claim because working longer hours 
and doing manual labor outside of his job description did not change his compensation or 
position.
107
 The conduct taken against the plaintiff in Grimsley was even worse than the tasks 
assigned to White in Burlington Northern, which the Supreme Court found harmful enough to 
establish a section 704 claim.
108
 Therefore, the conduct against the plaintiff in Grimsley would 
necessarily be harmful enough to establish a section 704 claim if the conduct in question was 
motivated by retaliation. It would be an incorrect reading of Title VII, and a misunderstanding of 
the statute‟s purpose, to provide less protection for the plaintiff in Grimsley, who suffered a more 
material harm than White, simply because the harmful act in that case was motivated by the very 
discrimination Title VII was at its core designed to prevent.
109
 If such an act is severe enough 
that it would dissuade an employee from filing a complaint of discrimination, and thus provide 
the basis for suit under section 704, then that same act motivated by discrimination must be 
sufficient to support a claim of actual discrimination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purposes behind section 704 led the Supreme Court to determine that a materiality 
standard was required for that section. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was able to establish the 
extent of the section 704 materiality standard based on that section‟s purposes. The Supreme 
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Court, however, did not speak at all as to whether a materiality standard should exist for section 
703, and, if so, what that standard should be. In making this determination, it must be understood 
that the purposes behind section 703 are different from the purposes of section 704. These 
differences may well suggest that no materiality standard should exist for section 703. At the 
least, however, the different purposes behind the two sections make it clear that any materiality 
standard for section 703 cannot be stricter on plaintiffs than the materiality standard established 
for section 704.   
 
 
